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Insurance Update - Commercial Lines November-December 2007

Focus: Insurance cases
Services: Insurance
Industry Focus: Insurance
Date: 29 November 2007
Author: National Insurance Team
Dibbs Abbott Stillman Lawyers restructured on 1 March, 2009.
The Sydney, Brisbane and Canberra offices are now DibbsBarker.

Independent payments do not amount to double insurance

Just what is “insurance”? Can any payment from one person to another to compensate them for a loss be considered “insurance”, particularly when it might entitle the person making the payment to claim contribution based on the principle of double insurance? The clear answer from the Victorian Court of Appeal is “no”, and the dividing line between insurance and other payments is made rather clearer by that court’s recent decision.

Ronald Steele ran a scaffolding business. In 1998, he won a sub-contract from R L Dew & Co Pty Ltd to assist in erecting scaffolding for a giant video screen in Albert Park, Melbourne for the Australian Grand Prix F1 race. R L Dew had been retained by Screenco Pty Ltd, who in turn had the contract with the Australian Grand Prix Corporation to erect the screen.

By the afternoon of 3 March 1998, Steele and his employees had finished the scaffolding work, which included a horizontal beam from which the screen was to be suspended. When Screenco employees tried to mount the screen, the beam bent and the screen fell to the ground and was effectively destroyed.

Steele held public liability insurance under a policy issued by a member of the HIH Insurance group. Steele however also had cover under a policy issued by SGIC (a predecessor of Insurance Australia Ltd) to the Australian Grand Prix Corporation. That policy extended to include contractors and sub-contractors of the Corporation. 

In 1999, Screenco sued Steele in the NSW Supreme Court. Steele made a claim on the HIH policy, and HIH paid some $80,000 in defence costs relating to that claim. However, in August 2001, HIH went into liquidation. The claim continued with HIH Claims Support Ltd (HCSL), the non-profit company set up to administer the Federal Government’s assistance package, stepping in. Judgment was eventually given in favour of Screenco in 2002 for around $1.4 million. HCSL paid out around $1.3 million (or 90%) of that judgment. Under the assistance scheme, Steele was required to assign any rights he might have to HCSL, and he did so.

Two claims were then made against the SGIC policy – first, a claim by HIH for contribution to the defence costs it had paid; and second, a claim in the name of Steele for indemnity under the policy.

At trial, the primary judge found that both claims succeeded. The claim for defence costs was allowed on the basis of double insurance – that is, both the HIH and SGIC policies responded to the claim, and the principle of equitable contribution required SGIC to contribute 50% of those costs. The indemnity claim was allowed on the basis, not of double insurance, but that the payment by HCSL was an ex gratia payment that did not disentitle Steele to claim on the SGIC policy. SGIC challenged both outcomes.

In the Victorian Court of Appeal, the court unanimously upheld SGIC’s appeal on the indemnity claim, but rejected its arguments on defence costs.

The indemnity claim had to fail because Steele had no right to payment under the SGIC policy because he had been indemnified in respect of the same risk by the HCSL payment.  That payment was not a payment by way of insurance; rather it was a payment made in consideration of Steele’s assignment of his rights to HCSL. Since it was not an “insurance” payment, SGIC was not subrogated to his rights and the principle of double insurance was therefore inapplicable.

The Court of Appeal found that the HCSL payment was not made ex gratia, but was intended to (and did) indemnify Steele against the Screenco claim. Once that payment was made, Steele’s liability to Screenco was correspondingly discharged. In other words, it rendered him “correspondingly harmless” in relation to the Screenco claim. It then followed that he was not entitled to be paid again in respect of the same risk under the SGIC policy.

The defence costs however were clearly paid pursuant to an insurance policy. As a result, HIH was entitled to contribution on the basis of double insurance towards the payments it had made.
In the result, SGIC’s appeal was allowed on the indemnity claim, meaning that HCSL was solely liable for the payment to Screenco; but its appeal on the defence costs was dismissed with the result it had to contribute to that (much smaller) claim.

Insurance Australia Ltd v HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd (in liq) [2007] VSCA 223
 

The whole is greater than the sum of the parts

The importance of looking at the whole of an insurance policy, not simply one small part, has been starkly illustrated by a recent decision from the Supreme Court of Victoria.

The action arose out of the rock fall at the Beaconsfield Mine in Tasmania, which received national media coverage when two miners were trapped and later rescued. The rock fall was caused by unusual seismic activity. Shortly after the incident, an inspector ordered the mine closed under Tasmania’s Workplace Health & Safety Act. That led to the mine’s owners (a number of joint venturers) sustaining losses. They claimed those losses under an industrial special risks policy with QBE Insurance.

The hearing involved a preliminary point as to whether the QBE policy responded to the claim by the mine owners.

The policy was in two parts: Section 1, which provided indemnity against physical loss, destruction or damage to property; and Section 2, which provided indemnity against business interruption in consequence of such physical loss, destruction or damage. As a result, indemnity under both sections was dependent on there being some kind of physical damage to property.

For the purposes of the hearing, the owners conceded that there was no relevant physical damage to the mine. They relied however on cl.23 to the policy, which read:

“Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, the Property Insured under this Policy is also covered against the risk of loss, destruction or damages arising from the actions of any civil authority during a conflagration or other catastrophe and for the purposes of preventing, minimising or retarding same and shall also include the closure of any Premises/operations by any civil authority due to the operation of a peril insured against.”

The owners argued that cl.23 provided a separate head of cover, distinct from both Sections 1 and 2 of the policy. In particular, they pointed to the different wording of the clause (which did not specifically refer to any “physical” loss), and the words “[n]otwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary”.

Justice Hargrave in the Victorian Supreme Court noted that, while the wording of cl.23 was slightly different from the remainder of the policy, it had to be construed in the overall context of the policy. That context was such that the policy required – whether a claim was made under Section 1 or Section 2 – that there be physical loss, destruction or damage to property. Cl.23 did not provide an independent head of cover, as (in contrast to the other sections of the policy) it contained no basis of settlement provisions.

Justice Hargrave found that cl.23 extended the cover provided by the policy to damage to insured property arising from:
  • “the actions of any civil authority during a conflagration or other catastrophe and for the purposes of preventing minimising or retarding same;  and (the cover) shall also include
  • the closure of any Premises/operations by any civil authority due to the operation of a peril insured against.”  
In the end then, as the owners had conceded that there was no physical damage to insured property (and such physical damage was crucial to indemnity under the policy), Justice Hargrave found that cl.23 did not respond to the owners’ claim. He however gave a strong hint that perhaps the owners should reconsider their concession in light of the events at the mine.

As a result, this is could well be simply the first round in a larger fight over indemnity.
 
Allstate Explorations NL v QBE Insurance (Aust) Ltd [2007] VSC 380
 

D &O: Possibility of a “claim” is enough

 
The sometimes convoluted language of commercial insurance policies can provide judges with a difficult task in interpretation, as a recent Queensland decision illustrates.

Mr Power was a Gold Coast City Council councillor.  From July to December 2005, the Crime and Misconduct Commission conducted an inquiry into suspected official misconduct within the Council relating to an election in March 2004 and other matters. Power was one of those whose conduct was investigated.  He was required to give a written statement to the inquiry, to produce documents and he also gave oral evidence.

In April 2006, Power was charged with breaches of the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 (Qld). The charges alleged that he gave the CMC a document containing information which he knew to be false or misleading in material particulars. The applicant engaged lawyers to defend him in that prosecution.

On 30 May 2006, Power’s lawyers wrote to the council's insurance broker, advising that they took the view that the circumstances of the charges triggered cover under the council’s directors’ & officers’ liability policy. They sought indemnity under that policy for Power’s ongoing legal fees in meeting the CMC charge; and consent for him to incur further legal fees in meeting the prosecution.

The relevant policy was issued by a Lloyd’s syndicate, and the named respondent was their representative in the action. The syndicate accepted that letter as a claim for indemnity.
Not having received any response from the syndicate, and faced with mounting costs, Power commenced proceedings seeking a declaration that he was entitled to indemnity under the policy for his legal costs in meeting the prosecution.

The syndicate initially declined indemnity on a number of grounds, but by the time the matter was heard, a magistrate had found that Power had no case to answer on one charge and acquitted him on the other charge. It defended the application on the basis that, on the proper construction of the policy, the claim did not fall under it.

The primary cover under the policy was to pay any losses that the insured was legally liable to pay for any “wrongful act”. The policy however also contained a number of extensions. Relevantly, extension (b) provided:
  • “Insurers shall pay on behalf of the Insured(s) on an ongoing basis all reasonable legal fees, costs and expenses incurred in being legally represented with respect to any legally compellable attendance at any Investigation provided that
  •  (1) the Investigation relates to matters which may give rise to a Claim…
  •  (4) such advanced payments by Insurers shall be repaid to Insurers in the event that the Insured(s) shall not be entitled to payment of any Loss or receipt of any benefit under this Section.”
The term “Claim” was defined as a “notice received by … the Insured … of the intention of a person or entity to hold the Insured responsible for the results of any Wrongful Act”.

At first instance, the hearing judge dismissed Power’s application, principally on the ground that none of the matters encompassed in the charge had any potential to give rise to a “Claim” within the meaning of the policy. Power appealed to the Court of Appeal.

By a 2-1 majority, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal (Justice Philippedes dissented, and would have upheld the decision at first instance). Justices Jerrard and Fryberg found, firstly, that the document referred to in the charge was provided by Mr Power to the CMC in the course of his duties as a Councillor. It was therefore a “wrongful act”, as defined in the policy.

They were also satisfied that the CMC’s actions amounted to an “Investigation”.

The majority crucially found that the summary hearing and the CMC investigation related to matters which “may give rise to a Claim”, within the meaning the first part of the proviso in extension (b).  They considered that the prospect of charges for an indictable offence would satisfy the definition of “Claim”. 

The claim for indemnity in the letter dated 30 May 2006 was made when proceedings in the Magistrates Court were on foot. Proof that Power had provided misleading documents would establish not only the simple offence with which he was charged, but was also capable of supporting an indictable offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice.

The possibility, before the dismissal of the charges in the Magistrates Court, that there might be a prosecution instead for an indictable offence, was enough to satisfy the requirement that the “Investigation” related to matters which “may give rise to a Claim”. At the time Power sought indemnity, it was possible that proceedings for an indictable offence might be brought. That was enough to trigger indemnity under extension (b).

Even though the majority acknowledge that the syndicate’s argument – that Power had not in fact been charged with any indictable offence – was one based on “commonsense”, it had to yield to the specific terms of this policy. As Power had satisfied those terms, he was entitled to indemnity.
 
Power v Markel Capital Ltd [2007] QCA 284
 

Mutual obligation is not insurance

 
A mutual corporation offering “protection” to members is not an “insurance company”, the Victorian Supreme Court has found. Capricorn Mutual was prosecuted under the Metropolitan Fire Brigades Act for failing to lodge a return. Such a return was however only required from an “insurance company”.

Capricorn Mutual was a mutual corporation limited by guarantee. Members were offered a range of benefits, including “protection” against certain business risks, including the risk of fire. Its rules however did not guarantee indemnity in particular circumstances. Instead, members had a right to have a claim considered and the Capricorn Mutual board had a discretion as to whether or not it met any claim.

Following the English decision of Medical Defence Union v Department of Trade (approved by the High Court in Bailey v New South Wales Medical Defence Union Limited); Justice Williams found that an entitlement to proper consideration of a claim is not sufficient to constitute a contract of insurance. It followed that the relationship between Capricorn Mutual and its members was not one of insurer and insured. 
 
Metropolitan Fire & Emergency Services Board v Capricorn Mutual Ltd [2007] VSC 413
 

Damages must limit “extravagance”

Regular readers will recall that we previously discussed the case of Fung v Stocovaz concerning limits on the cost of repairs in property damage cases. That case has now had its sequel in the Court of Appeal; which has affirmed the earlier decision.

The facts were simple – Fung’s Mercedes Benz vehicle was damaged in an accident with Stocovaz. The vehicle was repaired at a cost of around $14,000. Stocovaz’s insurer admitted liability, but contended that the cost of the repairs was unreasonable, and they should not have cost more than $6,000.

The primary judge held that that Fung was entitled to be indemnified by the defendant for the actual cost of the repairs, provided that cost was not extravagant. The defendant applied for leave to appeal.

In the Court of Appeal, Justice Handley found that the primary judge’s decision was substantially correct. He found there were two limitations on claims for damages based on the cost of repairs. Firstly, the claim cannot be for more than the actual cost of repairs; and secondly, that cost must not be extravagant or unreasonable. The terms “extravagant” and “unreasonable” in this context were interchangeable terms.
As a result, leave to appeal was refused, meaning the primary decision stood. Interestingly, Justice Basten seemed to agree with earlier comments that the court in this case seemed to have become a “pawn” in “a commercial war presently being waged between various insurance companies and repairers”
 
Stocovaz v Fung [2007] NSWCA 199
 

“Old” pollution not excluded

Forbes Municipal Council operated a gasworks in Forbes from around 1920 to 1950. When the gasworks was closed, the council used the land for a variety of purposes. In 1981, Forbes Municipal Council was amalgamated with another council to form Forbes Shire Council. The new council became the owner of the land; and in 1989 decided to dispose of it.

The former gasworks site was sold to a developer who built a strata title property on it. The strata title plan was registered in 1990, but in 1991, the Council received advice concerning the presence of toxic materials (notably tar) at the site. The Council gave notice to its insurer GIO of circumstances that might give rise to a claim. In 1994, the owners of the strata title units gave notice of such a claim, and in 1999 proceedings were commenced.
 
GIO declined indemnity under the policy, arguing that the claims were excluded by the pollution exclusion in the policy. That clause read:

“GIO shall not be liable for...

POLLUTION

15. claims arising directly or indirectly out of any activity or inactivity of the insured or person or legal entity for whose action or inaction the insured may be legally liable which activity is or results in the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of:

(a) smoke, vapours, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals or gases

(b) any products, by-products or waste materials of any description whatsoever

(c) any substance or energy capable of causing irritation, contamination, pollution, or injury or damage to persons or damage to property into or on to land or any vegetation or building thereon, any water course or body of water, or into the atmosphere or ether ....”
Chief Justice Young found that the relevant activity (i.e. operation of the gasworks), ceased to be a cause of the claim in 1950 when it was closed. Although tar in the ground was a possible cause of the claim, this ceased to be connected with the activity of the gasworks well before it became a problem.

In addition, it was hard to see how an exception in an insurance policy could relate back to an activity which had ceased before the policy came into force.

As a result, the exclusion did not apply.

Interestingly, Chief Justice Young also concluded that the council was probably not liable for the (then) potential liability of its predecessor. As no liability had been established against the previous council before it was amalgamated, the current entity was not responsible for any liability flowing from its activities. It followed that in this instance, the pollution in question was not the result of any act of the insured.

Forbes Shire Council v AG Australia Holdings Ltd [2007] NSWSC 847

 

New rules for foreign insurers

Direct offshore foreign insurers (DOFIs) and discretionary mutual funds (DMFs) operating in Australia face new requirements for operating in Australia. The Financial Sector Legislation Amendment (Discretionary Mutual Funds and Direct Offshore Foreign Insurers) Act 2007 received assent on 24 September 2007.      
                        
The changes brought about by the Act (which will not be fully operational until 1 July 2008) require DOFIs wishing to continue operating in the Australian market to be authorised by APRA. This means that DOFIs now need to have a general insurance licence and be subject to prudential regulation through APRA. It should be noted however that the requirement does not apply to offshore foreign reinsurers.

DMFs will not need to be authorised but they will be required to supply certain information to APRA.

APRA now recognises five different categories of insurer: locally incorporated insurers, wholly owned subsidiaries of local or foreign insurers, foreign insurers operating as foreign branches, association captives, and sole parent captives.

The new system also involves amendments to the Corporations Act to require Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL) holders dealing in insurance products to only deal in products of APRA-authorised insurers, unless an exemption exists in a particular case. Just what those exemptions will be have not yet been finalised, but a Treasury discussion paper proposes three exemptions – for “high-value” insureds; for “atypical” insurance lines (e.g. kidnapping & ransom cover) not commonly available in Australia; and a “case-by-case” exemption where the cover required cannot be placed in Australia and other exemptions do not apply.

Once finalised, the exemptions will be promulgated by way of regulations.

And finally, a very important note for aviation insurers…

Two Irish hunters got a pilot to fly them to Canada to hunt moose.

They managed to bag 6. As they were loading the plane to return, the pilot said the plane could take only 4 moose. The two lads objected strongly.

“Last year we shot six. The pilot let us take them all and he had the same plane as yours.”
Reluctantly, the pilot gave in and all six were loaded. However, even on full power, the little plane couldn't handle the load and went down.

Somehow, surrounded by the moose bodies, Paddy, Mick & the pilot survived the crash. After climbing out of the wreckage, Paddy asked Mick, “Any idea where we are?”

Mick replied, “I think we're pretty close to where we crashed last year.”


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