“Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, the Property Insured under this Policy is also covered against the risk of loss, destruction or damages arising from the actions of any civil authority during a conflagration or other catastrophe and for the purposes of preventing, minimising or retarding same and shall also include the closure of any Premises/operations by any civil authority due to the operation of a peril insured against.”
The owners argued that cl.23 provided a separate head of cover, distinct from both Sections 1 and 2 of the policy. In particular, they pointed to the different wording of the clause (which did not specifically refer to any “physical” loss), and the words “[n]otwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary”.
Justice Hargrave in the Victorian Supreme Court noted that, while the wording of cl.23 was slightly different from the remainder of the policy, it had to be construed in the overall context of the policy. That context was such that the policy required – whether a claim was made under Section 1 or Section 2 – that there be physical loss, destruction or damage to property. Cl.23 did not provide an independent head of cover, as (in contrast to the other sections of the policy) it contained no basis of settlement provisions.
Justice Hargrave found that cl.23 extended the cover provided by the policy to damage to insured property arising from:
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“the actions of any civil authority during a conflagration or other catastrophe and for the purposes of preventing minimising or retarding same; and (the cover) shall also include
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the closure of any Premises/operations by any civil authority due to the operation of a peril insured against.”
In the end then, as the owners had conceded that there was no physical damage to insured property (and such physical damage was crucial to indemnity under the policy), Justice Hargrave found that cl.23 did not respond to the owners’ claim. He however gave a strong hint that perhaps the owners should reconsider their concession in light of the events at the mine.
As a result, this is could well be simply the first round in a larger fight over indemnity.
Allstate Explorations NL v QBE Insurance (Aust) Ltd [2007] VSC 380
D &O: Possibility of a “claim” is enough
The sometimes convoluted language of commercial insurance policies can provide judges with a difficult task in interpretation, as a recent Queensland decision illustrates.
Mr Power was a Gold Coast City Council councillor. From July to December 2005, the Crime and Misconduct Commission conducted an inquiry into suspected official misconduct within the Council relating to an election in March 2004 and other matters. Power was one of those whose conduct was investigated. He was required to give a written statement to the inquiry, to produce documents and he also gave oral evidence.
In April 2006, Power was charged with breaches of the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 (Qld). The charges alleged that he gave the CMC a document containing information which he knew to be false or misleading in material particulars. The applicant engaged lawyers to defend him in that prosecution.
On 30 May 2006, Power’s lawyers wrote to the council's insurance broker, advising that they took the view that the circumstances of the charges triggered cover under the council’s directors’ & officers’ liability policy. They sought indemnity under that policy for Power’s ongoing legal fees in meeting the CMC charge; and consent for him to incur further legal fees in meeting the prosecution.
The relevant policy was issued by a Lloyd’s syndicate, and the named respondent was their representative in the action. The syndicate accepted that letter as a claim for indemnity.
Not having received any response from the syndicate, and faced with mounting costs, Power commenced proceedings seeking a declaration that he was entitled to indemnity under the policy for his legal costs in meeting the prosecution.
The syndicate initially declined indemnity on a number of grounds, but by the time the matter was heard, a magistrate had found that Power had no case to answer on one charge and acquitted him on the other charge. It defended the application on the basis that, on the proper construction of the policy, the claim did not fall under it.
The primary cover under the policy was to pay any losses that the insured was legally liable to pay for any “wrongful act”. The policy however also contained a number of extensions. Relevantly, extension (b) provided:
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“Insurers shall pay on behalf of the Insured(s) on an ongoing basis all reasonable legal fees, costs and expenses incurred in being legally represented with respect to any legally compellable attendance at any Investigation provided that
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(1) the Investigation relates to matters which may give rise to a Claim…
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(4) such advanced payments by Insurers shall be repaid to Insurers in the event that the Insured(s) shall not be entitled to payment of any Loss or receipt of any benefit under this Section.”
The term “Claim” was defined as a “notice received by … the Insured … of the intention of a person or entity to hold the Insured responsible for the results of any Wrongful Act”.
At first instance, the hearing judge dismissed Power’s application, principally on the ground that none of the matters encompassed in the charge had any potential to give rise to a “Claim” within the meaning of the policy. Power appealed to the Court of Appeal.
By a 2-1 majority, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal (Justice Philippedes dissented, and would have upheld the decision at first instance). Justices Jerrard and Fryberg found, firstly, that the document referred to in the charge was provided by Mr Power to the CMC in the course of his duties as a Councillor. It was therefore a “wrongful act”, as defined in the policy.
They were also satisfied that the CMC’s actions amounted to an “Investigation”.
The majority crucially found that the summary hearing and the CMC investigation related to matters which “may give rise to a Claim”, within the meaning the first part of the proviso in extension (b). They considered that the prospect of charges for an indictable offence would satisfy the definition of “Claim”.
The claim for indemnity in the letter dated 30 May 2006 was made when proceedings in the Magistrates Court were on foot. Proof that Power had provided misleading documents would establish not only the simple offence with which he was charged, but was also capable of supporting an indictable offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice.
The possibility, before the dismissal of the charges in the Magistrates Court, that there might be a prosecution instead for an indictable offence, was enough to satisfy the requirement that the “Investigation” related to matters which “may give rise to a Claim”. At the time Power sought indemnity, it was possible that proceedings for an indictable offence might be brought. That was enough to trigger indemnity under extension (b).
Even though the majority acknowledge that the syndicate’s argument – that Power had not in fact been charged with any indictable offence – was one based on “commonsense”, it had to yield to the specific terms of this policy. As Power had satisfied those terms, he was entitled to indemnity.
Power v Markel Capital Ltd [2007] QCA 284
Mutual obligation is not insurance
A mutual corporation offering “protection” to members is not an “insurance company”, the Victorian Supreme Court has found. Capricorn Mutual was prosecuted under the Metropolitan Fire Brigades Act for failing to lodge a return. Such a return was however only required from an “insurance company”.
Capricorn Mutual was a mutual corporation limited by guarantee. Members were offered a range of benefits, including “protection” against certain business risks, including the risk of fire. Its rules however did not guarantee indemnity in particular circumstances. Instead, members had a right to have a claim considered and the Capricorn Mutual board had a discretion as to whether or not it met any claim.
Following the English decision of Medical Defence Union v Department of Trade (approved by the High Court in Bailey v New South Wales Medical Defence Union Limited); Justice Williams found that an entitlement to proper consideration of a claim is not sufficient to constitute a contract of insurance. It followed that the relationship between Capricorn Mutual and its members was not one of insurer and insured.
Metropolitan Fire & Emergency Services Board v Capricorn Mutual Ltd [2007] VSC 413
Damages must limit “extravagance”
Regular readers will recall that we previously discussed the case of Fung v Stocovaz concerning limits on the cost of repairs in property damage cases. That case has now had its sequel in the Court of Appeal; which has affirmed the earlier decision.
The facts were simple – Fung’s Mercedes Benz vehicle was damaged in an accident with Stocovaz. The vehicle was repaired at a cost of around $14,000. Stocovaz’s insurer admitted liability, but contended that the cost of the repairs was unreasonable, and they should not have cost more than $6,000.
The primary judge held that that Fung was entitled to be indemnified by the defendant for the actual cost of the repairs, provided that cost was not extravagant. The defendant applied for leave to appeal.
In the Court of Appeal, Justice Handley found that the primary judge’s decision was substantially correct. He found there were two limitations on claims for damages based on the cost of repairs. Firstly, the claim cannot be for more than the actual cost of repairs; and secondly, that cost must not be extravagant or unreasonable. The terms “extravagant” and “unreasonable” in this context were interchangeable terms.
As a result, leave to appeal was refused, meaning the primary decision stood. Interestingly, Justice Basten seemed to agree with earlier comments that the court in this case seemed to have become a “pawn” in “a commercial war presently being waged between various insurance companies and repairers”
Stocovaz v Fung [2007] NSWCA 199
“Old” pollution not excluded
Forbes Municipal Council operated a gasworks in Forbes from around 1920 to 1950. When the gasworks was closed, the council used the land for a variety of purposes. In 1981, Forbes Municipal Council was amalgamated with another council to form Forbes Shire Council. The new council became the owner of the land; and in 1989 decided to dispose of it.
The former gasworks site was sold to a developer who built a strata title property on it. The strata title plan was registered in 1990, but in 1991, the Council received advice concerning the presence of toxic materials (notably tar) at the site. The Council gave notice to its insurer GIO of circumstances that might give rise to a claim. In 1994, the owners of the strata title units gave notice of such a claim, and in 1999 proceedings were commenced.
GIO declined indemnity under the policy, arguing that the claims were excluded by the pollution exclusion in the policy. That clause read:
“GIO shall not be liable for...
POLLUTION
15. claims arising directly or indirectly out of any activity or inactivity of the insured or person or legal entity for whose action or inaction the insured may be legally liable which activity is or results in the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of:
(a) smoke, vapours, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals or gases
(b) any products, by-products or waste materials of any description whatsoever
(c) any substance or energy capable of causing irritation, contamination, pollution, or injury or damage to persons or damage to property into or on to land or any vegetation or building thereon, any water course or body of water, or into the atmosphere or ether ....”
Chief Justice Young found that the relevant activity (i.e. operation of the gasworks), ceased to be a cause of the claim in 1950 when it was closed. Although tar in the ground was a possible cause of the claim, this ceased to be connected with the activity of the gasworks well before it became a problem.
In addition, it was hard to see how an exception in an insurance policy could relate back to an activity which had ceased before the policy came into force.
As a result, the exclusion did not apply.
Interestingly, Chief Justice Young also concluded that the council was probably not liable for the (then) potential liability of its predecessor. As no liability had been established against the previous council before it was amalgamated, the current entity was not responsible for any liability flowing from its activities. It followed that in this instance, the pollution in question was not the result of any act of the insured.
Forbes Shire Council v AG Australia Holdings Ltd [2007] NSWSC 847
New rules for foreign insurers
Direct offshore foreign insurers (DOFIs) and discretionary mutual funds (DMFs) operating in Australia face new requirements for operating in Australia. The Financial Sector Legislation Amendment (Discretionary Mutual Funds and Direct Offshore Foreign Insurers) Act 2007 received assent on 24 September 2007.
The changes brought about by the Act (which will not be fully operational until 1 July 2008) require DOFIs wishing to continue operating in the Australian market to be authorised by APRA. This means that DOFIs now need to have a general insurance licence and be subject to prudential regulation through APRA. It should be noted however that the requirement does not apply to offshore foreign reinsurers.
DMFs will not need to be authorised but they will be required to supply certain information to APRA.
APRA now recognises five different categories of insurer: locally incorporated insurers, wholly owned subsidiaries of local or foreign insurers, foreign insurers operating as foreign branches, association captives, and sole parent captives.
The new system also involves amendments to the Corporations Act to require Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL) holders dealing in insurance products to only deal in products of APRA-authorised insurers, unless an exemption exists in a particular case. Just what those exemptions will be have not yet been finalised, but a Treasury discussion paper proposes three exemptions – for “high-value” insureds; for “atypical” insurance lines (e.g. kidnapping & ransom cover) not commonly available in Australia; and a “case-by-case” exemption where the cover required cannot be placed in Australia and other exemptions do not apply.
Once finalised, the exemptions will be promulgated by way of regulations.
And finally, a very important note for aviation insurers…
Two Irish hunters got a pilot to fly them to Canada to hunt moose.
They managed to bag 6. As they were loading the plane to return, the pilot said the plane could take only 4 moose. The two lads objected strongly.
“Last year we shot six. The pilot let us take them all and he had the same plane as yours.”
Reluctantly, the pilot gave in and all six were loaded. However, even on full power, the little plane couldn't handle the load and went down.
Somehow, surrounded by the moose bodies, Paddy, Mick & the pilot survived the crash. After climbing out of the wreckage, Paddy asked Mick, “Any idea where we are?”
Mick replied, “I think we're pretty close to where we crashed last year.”